Justice as a Virtue: The Priority of Needs vs. Entitlement

Conclusion: In modern society, law is not a judge of morality but a negotiation of conflicting personal interests.

1. The concept of justice and fairness is entirely relative to the individual, not the community (i).

a. Law is the unanimous rule of “obedience” an individual is expected to live by (244).

i. Rules are a “prior agreement” and not necessarily something that molds to the desires of every individual (i).

b. Our self-interested culture prevents basic issues to be rationally judged (244).

c. “A community is composed of individuals, each with his or her own interest, who then have to come together and formulate common rules of life (250).”

2. What a person considers politically “fair” and “unfair” is based on his social and economic position. (245).

a. For example, redistributive taxation is either unjust or just depending on a taxpayer’s personal values (245).

i.  An individual may believe raising taxes is an injustice to his hard-earned livelihood (244).

ii. An individual may think not raising taxes is an injustice to the condition of the poor and deprived (245).

iii. “The price for one person…receiving justice is always paid by someone else (246).”

b. Thus, a community cannot decide that “entitlement” is more or less moral than “need”—it is an individual determination (i).

3.    Justice is neither moral nor immoral (i).

a. John Rawles: Justice is the equal redistribution of “needs” to help the disadvantageous (249).

i. The rational form of justice as long as a person has a “veil of ignorance” and is completely detached from the knowledge of his own self-interest (i).

                        b. Robert Nozick: Justice is what you earn and are “entitled” to (247).

                                    i. When you directly acquire something from its “original” source (247).

                                    ii. When you acquire something by trading or buying (247).

                        c. Premise 4a and 4b are false.

                                    i. No one is ever under a veil of ignorance (249).

ii. No one is a legitimate heir of anything—everything has been stolen or taken by force at one point in history before it was inherited by anyone (251).

d. “The metaphor of ‘weighing’ moral claims is not just inappropriate, but misleading (246).”

e. Justice is an intermediary between the extreme views of Rawles and Nozick (i).

4. Justice is a compromise within a community (i).

a. Society can never reach a moral consensus (252).

b. “[Laws] play the role of [a] peacekeeping or truce-keeping body by negotiating its way through an impasse of conflict (253).”

c. Therefore, laws are not lessons of morality; they are compromises between what person A and person B finds personally virtuous (i).

d. Regardless of what an individual thinks is good, a law is only relevant if it is good for the entire community (i).

Justice

Conclusion: Justice is  "complete virtue."

I.                   Justice and Injustice

A.    Justice-is commonly defined as a state that makes us just agents. In other words, the state that makes us do justice and wish what is just (67/1129a).

B.      Similarly, to the way that justice is defined so is injustice- the state that makes us do injustice and wish what is unjust (67/1129a).

C.     Often a pair of contrary states is recognized from the other contrary, and often the states are recognized from their subjects (67/1129a).

D.    For instance, the good state is thickness of flesh, thus the bad state must be thinness of flesh, and the thing that produces the good state must be what produces thickness of flesh (67/1129a).

 

E.     Justice is a state of character, and hence may be studied by reference to its contrary.

II.                Justice and injustice are both spoken of in more than one way (68/1129b).

A.    According to Aristotle the word justice has two main definitions, that which is lawful and that which is fair and equal (68/1129b).

B.     According to Aristotle the word injustice also has two main definitions, that which is lawless and unfair (68/1129b).

III.             Aristotle uses the term “General” justice to refer to justice that is lawful (228).

A.    Since the lawful person is just, it follows that whatever is lawful is just, granted that the laws are lawful, and thus just (68/1129b).

B.     The laws aim either at the common benefit of all, or at the benefit of those in control, whose control rest on virtue according to a correct political system or a deviant political system (68/1129b).

C.     Thus, lawful things are in some sense just and whatever produces and maintains happiness and preserves happiness in a political community is called just (68/1129b).

D.    The law also instructs one to do the actions of a brave person, for example not to flee battle, which requires action corresponding with other virtues and not vices. 

E.     “General” justice is concerned with the compliance of law, which deal with matters that are commonly appropriate with respect to virtue or honor and prescribes actions of a virtuous man through certain commands and prohibitions.

IV.             “General” justice is “complete virtue” (68/1129b).

A.    It is complete virtue but not complete virtue without qualification, but complete virtue in relation to another (69/1129b).

B.     Justice is often thought to be supreme among the virtues (69/1129b).

C.     Moreover, justice is complete virtue to the highest degree, since the end of justice is that of complete virtue (69/1129b).

D.    The just person is able to exercise virtue for someone else; although the fact is that many are unable in what concerns others (69/1129b).

E.     Justice is the only virtue that seems to be another person’s good, since it does what benefits another (69/1130a).

F.      For instance, the worst man is one whose evil habits affect both himself and his friends, while the best man is one whose virtue is directed to others rather than him (69/1130a).

G.    This kind of justice is the whole of virtue, and its contrary is the whole of vice (69/1130a).

H.    “General” justice requires complete virtue of character.

Justice On Oneself

Conclusion: One can never act unjustly toward him/herself. 

Premises

1      1.     Justice is determined in equality of distribution.

a.     For if the people involved are not equal, they will not ‘justly’ receive equal shares. (1131a 20)

b.     In equality and injustice causes conflict (i)

c.     Whenever equals receive unequal shares, or unequals equal shares, in a distribution, that is the source of quarrels and accusations. (1131a 25)

2     2.     An just person cannot be unfair when he is distributing. (i)

a.     Just must be intermediate and equal, and relate to something and for some people. (1131a 15)

b.     It must be between too much and too little; insofar as it is equal, it involves two things; and insofar as it is just, it is just for some people. (1131a 15)

3     3.     A justly virtuous person cannot distribute to oneself unequally.

a.     The same person could not lose or gain the same thing at the same time. (1138a 15)

b.     What is just or unjust must always involve more than one person. (1138a25)

c.     No one commits adultery with his own wife, or burgles his own house, or Steals his own possessions. (1138a 25)

4      4.     Justice is voluntary therefore when acting with injustice it is involuntary except by coincidence.

a.     Whenever one does them unwillingly, one neither does justice nor does                                     Injustice, except coincidentally. (1135a 20)

b.     An act of injustice and a just act are defined by the voluntary. For when the act is voluntary, the agent is blamed. (1135a 20)

5      5.     One cannot act unjust toward himself. (i)

a.     For it is impossible to suffer injustice if no one does injustice and impossible to receive justice is no one does justice. (1136a 30)

b.     The same person could not lose or gain the same thing at the same time.

            (1138a 15)

c.     What is just or unjust must always involve more than one person. (1138a25)

d.     No one commits adultery with his own wife, or burgles his own house, or steals his own possessions. (1138a 25)

6      6.     Even in suicide one does not act unjustly to himself or herself.

a.     If someone suicides he/she is in violation of reason and therefore not virtuous and does not willingly act with injustice. (i)

b.     No one willingly suffers injustice. (1138a 10)

c.     The city-state is the one who receives the act of injustice. (i)

d.     That is why city both penalizes him and inflicts further dishonor on him for destroying himself, on the ground that he does injustice to the city. (1138a 10)

True Friendship: Interwoven With Virtue

Conclusion: True friendship involves virtue

----------------

Premises:

1. Friendship, according to Aristotle is part of life

A. Friends act to better each other (1155a)

B. Friendships are natural (1155a)

C. Friends have no need of justice, and justice is only strengthened by friendship (1155a)

D. Friendship is fine (1155a)

2. Friendships have certain requirements that differentiate them from loving, for example, an inanimate object

            A. The friendship must be mutual between the two (1155b)

            B. The workings of the friendship should be reciprocated by each (1155b)

C. The Friendship must be acknowledged, the two must be aware of their goodwill for each other (1155b)

3. Distinguishing true friendship from other forms

            A. It is not because one is useful (Friendship of Utility) (1156a)

            B.  It is not because of the passion or pleasure one brings (Friendship of Pleasure) (1156b)

            C. True friendship is between those alike in virtue (Friendship of Goodness*)(1156b)

            D. Their similarity is in their goodness (1156b)

4. What consists in the friendships of good people

            A. The presence of trust does not need to be questioned (1157a)

            B. The purpose of friendship is for friendship in itself (1157a)

C. Friendships don’t have qualifications since good people are good, and they are friends as long as they are good (1157b)

D. Involve being useful to one another, as well as pleasure, but not for the purpose of these things (i)

5. The importance of giving and receiving between friends

            A. Friendship consists more so in giving and less in receiving (1159b)

            B. The love for one is matched by the worth of their friends (1159b)

C. Good people with good friends seek to prevent error in themselves, thus also to prevent relying on their friends as well as to not permit error in their friends as well (1159b)

6. True friends are friends in the sake of virtue

A. There are no fights between true friends, as they seek to make each other better (1162b)

B. Both friends get what they want from spending time together, given they are both good (1162b)

C. Justice in true friendship is achieved through good character, in addition, it is also unspoken (1162b)

D. A true friend will make the decision to do what is fine before what is beneficial (i)

           

           

           

            

Friendship and Self

Conclusion: "A friend is another himself"

1. A virtuous person has self-love.

      A. Self-love includes desiring what is good for oneself

2. In order for a friendship to be true, it has to have certain qualities.

     A. A friend is someone who desires good for the friend's sake (1166a)

     B. Friends have mutual enjoyments and activities (1166a)

     C. Friends spend time together (1166a)

     D. Friends make the same choices (1166a)

3. The key aspects of a good friendship originate from one's relationship with oneself (1166a)

     A. A virtuous and good person has a balanced soul (1166a)

     B. He wishes to be good and strives to achieve goodness through his actions (1166a)

     C. He wishes to live well and healthy (1166a)

     D. He wishes to spend time with himself (1166a)

4. One is related to a friend in the same way one is related to himself (1166a)

     A. A virtuous man perceives himself as good (1170b)

     B. A virtuous man finds his existence to be choiceworthy (1170b)

     C. This same virtuous man finds a true friend's experience to be equally choiceworthy (1170b)

     D. A man perceives his friend's being as he perceives his own (1170b)

Incontinence and Knowledge

Conclusion: An incontinent person does not have true knowledge of what they are doing. 

Premises:

1) There are two ways of knowing (1146b33).

     A)There is knowledge that you have but do not use, then there is knowledge that you have and you      use (1146b33).

   

     B) (i) By not using your knowledge it is possible to do wrong but not know that you did do wrong.

2) It is possible to have knowledge but not being able to use that knowledge.

      A) Some people, like those who are drunk, mad, or asleep have a kind of knowledge but in most        cases cannot use it due to their condition (1147a13).

       B) Strong feelings like lust or spirited reactions also undermine the use of knowledge the same as being drunk, mad, or asleep (1147a16)

       C) (i) It is easy to fall into incontinence when compelled by strong emotions like lust or when blinded by drunkenness or madness. 

3) A persons action may conflict with their knowledge if they have both the universal and 

particular premises but only use the universal (1147a).

      A) Particular premises are achievable in action whereas universal premises are not (1147a4). 

      B) (i) If someone only knows the general idea of something but not the particulars then they cannot  have true knowledge of what they are doing. 

4) Continence requires rational calculation (1145b11). 

      A) The incontinent person follows their base instinct rather than rational thought (1145b13

      B) (i) Knowledge requires rational thought otherwise it is only perceptual knowledge.

5) (i) The knowledge someone has when affected by incontinence is not true knowledge due to the lack of rational thought. 

      

      A)(i) Without rational though a person won’t be able to stop and think over what they are doing and won’t know if what they are doing is incontinent. 

Your State of Being Defines your Pleasures and Pains

Conclusion: The relation to pleasure and pain is a sign of one's nature or state.

Premises:

1. Virtue and vice of character are about pains and pleasures (1152b-114).

      a. (i) Only truly virtuous people take pleasure in the "right" things

      b. (i) Neither the incontinent, nor the continent person has this kind of virtue

2. There are two types of "goods;" One is an activity and the other is a state (1153a-115).

      a. The processes that restore us to our natural state are pleasant (1153a-115).

            i. (i) Everyone has a different "natural state," so the processes are also different.

      b. The activity in the appetite belongs to the rest of our state and nature (1153a-115). 

           i. (i) Our appetites are dependent on our state and nature.

3. We do not enjoy the same thing when our nature is being refilled as we enjoy when it is eventually fully restored (1153a-115). 

      a. When our nature is fully restored, we enjoy things that are pleasant without qualification (1153a-115). 

      b. When it is being refilled, we enjoy even the contrary things (1153a-115).

4. Pleasures are an activity of the natural state, and neither prudence nor any state is impeded by the pleasures arising from it, but only alien pleasures (1153a-116). 

      a. (i) The pleasures we gain from studying (learning) will only make us want to study more

      b. (i) The pleasures we gain from working out (getting in shape/healthy) will only make us want to work out more. 

             i. (i) The state we are in after we complete an activity (the pleasure) will determine how/if we repeat that activity again.

5. (i) Depending on your nature or state, you will pursue different pleasures.

      a. Children and animals pursue pleasures that are not good without qualification (1153-116).

      b. The temperate person avoids pleasures (1153-116).

      c. The prudent person pursues the painless life (1153-116). 

      d. Since the best nature and state neither is nor seems to be the same for all, they also do not all pursue the same pleasure though they all pursue some pleasure (1153b-117).

6. Some states and processes allow no excess of the pleasure in them (1154a-117).

      a. The bodily gods allow excess (1154a-117).

      b. The base person is base because he pursues the excess, but not because he pursues the necessary pleasures (1154a-117).

           i. All enjoy wines and sexual relations in some way, though not all in the right way (1154a-117).

      c. The base person avoids pain in general, not an excess of it (1154a20-118).

           i. Not all pain is contrary to excess unless you are pursuing excess (1154a20-118). 

7. Things are pleasant by nature when they produce action of a healthy nature (1154b-119).

          i. The reason why no one thing is always pleasant is because if something has a simple nature the same action will always be the most pleasant (1154b-119).

8. (i) We cannot judge what is pleasant without considering the state or nature of the person enjoying it

       a. If things are pleasant to people in bad condition, we should suppose that they are also unpleasant, except to these people (1173b-156).