Conclusion: The relation to pleasure and pain is a sign of one's nature or state.
Premises:
1. Virtue and vice of character are about pains and pleasures (1152b-114).
a. (i) Only truly virtuous people take pleasure in the "right" things
b. (i) Neither the incontinent, nor the continent person has this kind of virtue
2. There are two types of "goods;" One is an activity and the other is a state (1153a-115).
a. The processes that restore us to our natural state are pleasant (1153a-115).
i. (i) Everyone has a different "natural state," so the processes are also different.
b. The activity in the appetite belongs to the rest of our state and nature (1153a-115).
i. (i) Our appetites are dependent on our state and nature.
3. We do not enjoy the same thing when our nature is being refilled as we enjoy when it is eventually fully restored (1153a-115).
a. When our nature is fully restored, we enjoy things that are pleasant without qualification (1153a-115).
b. When it is being refilled, we enjoy even the contrary things (1153a-115).
4. Pleasures are an activity of the natural state, and neither prudence nor any state is impeded by the pleasures arising from it, but only alien pleasures (1153a-116).
a. (i) The pleasures we gain from studying (learning) will only make us want to study more
b. (i) The pleasures we gain from working out (getting in shape/healthy) will only make us want to work out more.
i. (i) The state we are in after we complete an activity (the pleasure) will determine how/if we repeat that activity again.
5. (i) Depending on your nature or state, you will pursue different pleasures.
a. Children and animals pursue pleasures that are not good without qualification (1153-116).
b. The temperate person avoids pleasures (1153-116).
c. The prudent person pursues the painless life (1153-116).
d. Since the best nature and state neither is nor seems to be the same for all, they also do not all pursue the same pleasure though they all pursue some pleasure (1153b-117).
6. Some states and processes allow no excess of the pleasure in them (1154a-117).
a. The bodily gods allow excess (1154a-117).
b. The base person is base because he pursues the excess, but not because he pursues the necessary pleasures (1154a-117).
i. All enjoy wines and sexual relations in some way, though not all in the right way (1154a-117).
c. The base person avoids pain in general, not an excess of it (1154a20-118).
i. Not all pain is contrary to excess unless you are pursuing excess (1154a20-118).
7. Things are pleasant by nature when they produce action of a healthy nature (1154b-119).
i. The reason why no one thing is always pleasant is because if something has a simple nature the same action will always be the most pleasant (1154b-119).
8. (i) We cannot judge what is pleasant without considering the state or nature of the person enjoying it
a. If things are pleasant to people in bad condition, we should suppose that they are also unpleasant, except to these people (1173b-156).
I believe that your first premise introduces your argument very well and it provides the reader with a good introduction to the topic of discussion. After reading below the first premise, I asked myself why does the incontinent or the continent have that kind of virtue? But that was immediately answered in the writing below the second premise where you stated that "everyone has a different natural state so the processes are different." It is interesting to say that pains and pleasures are categorized differently by certain people, but it makes sense to say that "only true virtuous people take pleasure in the 'right' things." I feel that this makes sense to me but it is difficult to explain because what is considered to be "right"? What is considered to be right by one person might be considered wrong by another person, so why can't the person who does not see it as right can't be virtuous either? I suppose it depends on the activity taking place. Overall, I think this was a good argument outline.
ReplyDeleteI had similar feelings to Eric when he posed the question of what is "right." I think this question comes up in a lot of philosophical arguments, and is important in this one. Like Eric mentioned, one person's view of "right" could be completely different than someone else's view, so in their mind, they may be doing something "right" while to others it may be seen as wrong. The same goes for certain cultural contexts, as well as words like "bad", "good", and others. More specific to this argument, I'm curious to know the exact definition of "bad condition" you mention in premise 8a, and "right way" in premise 6ai. On another note, I thought this was constructed nicely and it was easy to follow. The premises flow together as a whole, great job!
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